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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-16(l), 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission providing 
that Pinnacle Homes, Inc. (hereinafter "Pinnacle Homes") was a statutory employer and 
awarding Mr. Glen Ebmeyer (hereinafter "Mr. Ebmeyer") benefits under the statutory 
employer analysis against the assets of Pinnacle. Said Labor Commission Order was 
challenged in a timely motion for review and was subsequently appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1.) Whether the Labor Commission properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was 
an "employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), allowing Pinnacle 
Homes, Inc. to be found to be a statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
103(7). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When there is a mixed question of law and fact, the 
reviewing Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determinations 
"with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of correctness and 
a broad abuse of discretion standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Drake held that "where the issue is purely factual, 
appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly 
erroneous." Id. at 181 (citation omitted). When reviewing the factual findings of the 
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administrative agency, the reviewing court "will generally reverse only if the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, where the issue 
is a question of law, the reviewing court "gives no deference to the trial judge's or 
agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what 
the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
The Court recognized that not all issues fall clearly at one end of the spectrum or 
the other, and recognized that some issues involve mixed questions of law and fact. Id. 
Although the reviewing court will review the "underlying empirical facts under a 
deferential clear error standard," the Court further held the "legal effect of those facts is 
the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's 
resolution of such questions of law." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, an "agency's 
application of the law to the facts may, depending on the issue, be reviewed by an 
appellate court with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 
'correctness1 and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Finally, the Court determined that "although the empirical facts of [the 
employee's] case are reviewable for clear error, the conclusion as to whether those facts 
qualify [the employee] for workers' compensation benefits...is reviewable for 
correctness." Id. 
2.) The Utah Labor Commission's factual findings that Mr. Ebmeyer was an 
employee under §34A-2-103(7)(a) and finding that Pinnacle Homes was a general 
contractor are not supported by substantial evidence. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Supreme Court in Drake held that "where 
the issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if 
a finding is clearly erroneous." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (citations omitted). When 
reviewing the factual findings of the administrative agency, the reviewing court "will 
generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL 
On March 24, 2005, the Labor Commission issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. (Appellate Record Index Number (hereinafter "AR") 
143-150). Pinnacle Homes filed its Motion for Review before the Utah Labor 
Commission on April 22, 2005 (AR 151-215). The Labor Commission denied its motion 
for review (AR 217-222) on August 29, 2006. Pinnacle Homes filed its Petitioner for 
Review on September 28, 2006 (AR 223-225). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Mr. Ebemeyer was injured when he fell from the roof of a 
home while working for Platinum Builders/Mel Bagley (hereinafter "Platinum 
Builders"). Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application for hearing at the Utah Labor Commission 
seeking benefits as a result of Platinum Builders' failure to carry workers compensation 
insurance. The uncontradicted testimony presented to the Labor Commission was that 
Mr. Ebmeyer was Platinum Builders' employee. Despite this fact, the Commission held 
that Pinnacle Homes was a statutory employer even though the Uninsured Employers 
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Fund acknowledged at the hearing that Mr. Ebmeyer was not a Pinnacle Homes 
employee. 
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Ebmeyer filed his application for hearing. (AR 1-3). 
Pinnacle Homes filed its Answer pursuant to an Amended Notice of Formal Adjudicative 
Proceeding. (AR 116-126). The ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on March 24, 2005. (AR 143-150). Pinnacle Homes filed its Motion for 
Review on April 22, 2005. (AR 151-215). The Labor Commission filed its Order 
Denying Motion for Review on August 29, 2006. (AR 217-222). Pinnacle Homes filed 
the instant appeal. (AR 223-225). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Ebmeyer was employed with Platinum Builders as a shingler on new home 
construction beginning in January of 2003. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20). 
2. Mr. Ebmeyer received his work from Mel Beagley at Platinum Builders. (AR 
227: P28, L22 through P29, L10). 
3. After Mr. Ebmeyer received the call to appear for work, Mr. Ebmeyer usually 
arrived at the worksite with the worksite already stocked and ready for work. (AR 227: 
P29,L13-L24). 
4. Mr. Ebmeyer did not work for anyone other than Platinum Builders during the 
relevant time period from January of 2003 to when he was injured in August of 2003. 
(AR 227: P31, L2 through P32, L3). 
5. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that no one from Pinnacle Homes would ever come out 
to the houses he was working on to inspect his work. (AR 227: P36, L20 through P37, 
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L8). 
6. After his injury, Mr. Ebmeyer dealt with Mel Beagley at Platinum Builders in 
terms of reporting the injury and in terms of obtaining his last paycheck. (AR 227: P45, 
L9 through P46, L2). 
7. Mr. Ebmeyer never received a check from of any form from Pinnacle Homes. 
(AR227:P54,L5-L9). 
8. Mr. Ebmeyer never received any materials from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: 
P54,L10-L13). 
9. Mr. Ebmeyer never received any tools or any other supplies from Pinnacle 
Homes. (AR227: P54, L14-L17). 
10. Mr. Ebmeyer never received any transportation or directions from Pinnacle 
Homes telling him to go to work. (AR 227: P54, LI8 - L24). 
11. Mr. Ebmeyer never received any training from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: 
P57,L12-L20). 
12. Mr. Ebmeyer never received any directions from Pinnacle Homes as to what 
house to work on. (AR 227: P57, L21 through P58, L4). 
13. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he never saw anyone from Pinnacle Homes at any 
time at the job site upon which he was working when he suffered his accident. (AR 227: 
P72,L16 through P73, L6). 
14. When a representative from Pinnacle Homes was called to testify, he testified 
that Mr. Ebmeyer did not notify Pinnacle Homes of his injury, never requested Pinnacle 
Homes pay for his medical expenses, and never requested that Pinnacle Homes pay for 
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his lost wages. (AR 227: P76, L3 - L12). 
15. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Platinum Builders, a 
general contractor, had been hired to put roofs on the houses that Pinnacle Homes owned. 
(AR227:P76,L13-L23). 
16. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes never 
dealt with Mr. Ebmeyer, never called Mr. Ebmeyer, never supervised Mr. Ebmeyer or 
any of his work. (AR 227: P77, LI - L9). 
17. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes was not 
aware that anyone other than Mel Beagley and Platinum Builders was doing the roofs on 
the homes owned by Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P80, L8 - L12). 
18. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Mr. Beagley and Platinum 
Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR 227: 
P80,L13-L18). 
19. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes did not 
direct or control Mr. Beagley or Platinum Builders about how the work was done and left 
the inspections of the houses up to the cities. (AR 227: P98, L9 through P99, L5). 
20. With respect to workers compensation insurance, a representative from 
Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle Homes does not have any employees and does not 
do any of the physical work on the homes it owns. (AR 227: P95, L23 through P96, L6). 
21. Pinnacle Homes had dealt with its insurance agent in obtaining insurance for 
the business and was told it did not need workers compensation insurance as a result of 
Pinnacle Homes not having any employees. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21). 
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22. Pinnacle homes filed its application with the insurance agent notifying her that 
it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle Homes wanted 
to opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21). 
23. When the instant claim arose, the general liability carrier denied the claim as it 
already had notice that Pinnacle Homes did not have any employees, as Pinnacle Homes 
already had submitted in writing to its insurance agent. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P98, 
L8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an 
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is 
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4), 
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the 
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a) 
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If 
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to 
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case. 
The Commission's analysis of "supervision or control" was better geared to the 
only general contractor in the case - Platinum Builders. It was inappropriate to consider 
Pinnacle Homes a general contractor without defining what a general contractor is and 
without providing a factual basis for considering Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor 
for merely hiring a professional general contractor to place a roof on the home it owned. 
As a result, any analysis of Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor is misplaced and not 
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supported either in law or fact and this Court should overturn the Commission ruling with 
respect to the legal conclusion that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT PINNACLE 
HOMES WAS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-
104(4) 
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an 
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is 
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4), 
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the 
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a) 
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If 
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to 
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case. 
The Labor Commission Board of Appeals found Pinnacle Homes to be Mr. 
Ebmeyer's statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4) by providing that 
Pinnacle Homes did not provide written evidence to its workers compensation carrier that 
it was opting out of workers compensation. See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 
217-222, Page 3. As a result, the Labor Commission determined that Pinnacle Homes 
was an employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(2) and liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's 
injury under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a). Id at Pages 3-4. 
The concurring opinion put it succinctly when it provided the following: 
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance 
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upon Section 34A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees, 
within the meaning of § 104(4), are directors or officers. By enacting this section, 
the Utah Legislature has clearly established the public policy that certain limited, 
corporate employees may be exempt from workers' compensation coverage. 
However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to 
comply with the notice requirements of § 104(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance 
carrier to notify, in writing, of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its officers and 
directors from coverage and as "employees' [sic] under the Act. The majority's 
decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle; they 
could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance 
carrier which essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but 
we do not need workers' compensation coverage because we are electing to 
exempt all our officers and directors, which are our only employees, from 
coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to being 
"employers" under §103(7)(a). (Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217-222, 
Page 4). 
Pinnacle complied with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4) when it provided written 
notification to its insurance agent that it would be opting out of workers compensation 
coverage. Specifically, the only testimony on the subject was provided by Brad 
Liljenquist, a representative from Pinnacle Homes, before the Labor Commission. 
Mr. Liljenquist testified on Pinnacle Homes' behalf as follows: 
Q: Does Pinnacle Homes have any employees? 
A: They do not. 
Q: Has Pinnacle Homes ever had any employees? 
A: No. 
Q: Does Pinnacle Homes ever actually do any of the physical work on any of the 
homes it owns? 
A: No. 
* * * 
Q: When you first organized this business, did you attempt to obtain all the 
insurance coverage that you needed? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: How did you do that? 
A: I went to the office of our insurance agent, Wendy Dean Marshall, I believe is 
her name, and told her what Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc., was going to do, told her 
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about the organizational structure and asked her to provide us with the insurance 
coverages that we needed. 
Q: Did she make any queries as to whether or not Pinnacle Homes had any 
employees? 
A: She did. 
Q: And what did you tell her? 
A: / told her that we did not have employees. 
Q: And did you file applications as such with her? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did she then tell you what type of insurance you needed? 
A: She did. She—she said that we would need general liability insurance, 
insurance on our - on a little office space that we rent, and - and she told - on the 
workers compensation, she said that since we were all owners of the corporation 
that we would not - we would not be required to purchase workers compensation 
insurance; we could opt out of it. 
Q: And did you in fact opt out of it? 
A: I told Wendy that we wanted to opt out of it. 
Q: Okay. And so did you - did you obtain insurance for the business? 
A: We did. 
Q: And once you received notice that this application was filed, did you turn that 
over to them? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what did they tell you? 
A: They told us that it was the general liability insurance that was submitted to, 
and they told us that they - that we were not covered under that policy for workers 
compensation. 
Q: And why? Did they tell you why? Because you didn't have any employees? 
A: We didn't have any employees. 
(AR 227: P95, L23 through P98, L8) (emphasis added). 
This was the only evidence presented on the issue. As determined from the 
testimony, Pinnacle Homes provided written notification to the insurance agent that it did 
not have any employees and subsequently opted out of workers compensation coverage. 
This is enough to comply with Section 104(4) and enough to remove Pinnacle Homes 
from an "employer" status in the instant case. 
It appears that Subsection 104(4)(b) is a provision to exclude corporate officers 
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when there are other employees working for the corporation. In that situation, the 
directors of the corporation notify the workers compensation carrier that it will cover 
employees, but not the directors of the corporation. In this situation alone does it make 
sense that the directors of the corporation would have to notify its workers compensation 
carrier of the employees to cover and which personnel not to cover. 
Otherwise, the concurring opinion is true. Why would you notify a workers 
compensation carrier that you do not need their services for you corporation when the 
entire corporation has no employees and only consists of directors, who have chosen not 
to receive workers compensation coverage? It does not make sense to provide said 
written notice to a workers compensation carrier when the only personnel of a 
corporation are its directors who have opted out of coverage. 
The Labor Commission relied upon Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 
257 (Utah 1998) for its determination that Pinnacle Homes needed to provide notification 
to its workers compensation carrier. See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217-
222, Page 3. Olsen, however, is immediately distinguishable due to the fact the employer 
in Olsen had more than one employee and the director of the company wanted to reduce 
his premiums by excluding himself from coverage. 956 P.2d at 258. Because the 
employer in Olsen had other employees and failed to comply with 104(b), the Court ruled 
in favor of coverage and allowed for workers compensation benefits. 
In the instant case, there were no other employees. There were only the directors 
of the Pinnacle Homes and, therefore, there was no workers compensation carrier to 
provide written notification of their election out of workers compensation coverage. This 
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is entirely distinguishable from the facts in Olsen, which is what the Commission relied 
upon when it found Pinnacle Homes to be an "employer" under the statute. Outside of 
§ 104(b), there is no other requirement that written notification be provided in a case 
where the company has no employees and is made up entirely of directors and/or 
shareholders. 
It makes sense when a company has regular employees to provide coverage for the 
employees but not the directors in order to minimize the cost of the insurance coverage. 
In this situation alone would you need to provide a written list under §104(4)(b) about 
who should be covered and who does not need coverage. The statute itself specifies that 
a writing is necessary in this instance alone. 
The Labor Commission did not properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an 
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-103(2), as an employer is 
defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers." Under § 104(4), 
Pinnacle Homes has no employees and cannot be considered an employer under the 
definition of the statute. If Pinnacle Homes is not defined as an "employer", §103(7)(a) 
would similarly not apply as it applies only to any "person who is an employer ...". If 
the person is not an "employer" under the statute, then §103(7)(a) does not apply to 
Pinnacle Homes in the instant case. 
For reasons of concern provided in the concurring opinion of the Labor 
Commission Order Denying Motion for Review and for the reasons listed above, 
Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" as defined by the statute and, therefore, cannot be a 
statutory employer under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a). This Court, therefore, 
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should reverse the Labor Commission ruling and enter an order removing Pinnacle 
Homes from any liability below as Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" under the 
statutes of this state. 
A. PINNACLE HOMES ALSO IS NOT MR- EBMEYER'S OR 
PLATINUM BUILDER'S EMPLOYER UNDER THE 
TRADITIONAL 'RIGHT TO CONTROL TEST' 
Although the Board of Appeals did not address the issue of whether Mr. Ebmeyer 
and/or Platinum Builders were employees of Pinnacle Homes, the underlying decision, 
however, utilized the word "operative" in awarding benefits. The ALJ misinterpreted the 
definition of the word "operative" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104 to include 
an independent contractor for purposes of workers compensation coverage. 
According to the ALJ, an operative is considered to be an employee if the 
operative is in the service of an employer. As noted above, Pinnacle Homes was not an 
"employer" and, therefore, the analysis in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(l)(b) should not 
apply to it. §104(l)(b) provides that "each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employes one or more workers or operatives 
regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment under a contract for 
hire..." (Emphasis added). 
Even if the Court applies this test for operatives to the instant case, Mr. Ebmeyer 
was not an operative or an employee for workers compensation purposes with respect to 
Pinnacle Homes. 
Under § 34A-2-103(7)(a), in order to find a person is a statutory employer of the 
listed parties, the following findings must be made: 1) the person is an employer; 2) the 
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person/employer procured work to be done wholly or in part for the person by a 
contractor; 3) the person/employer retains supervision or control over the work of the 
contractor; and 4) the work to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
person/employer. 
The term "employer" for the purposes of the Workers Compensation Act and the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act is generally defined in § 34A-2-103(2). Under § 34A-2-
103(2), a person who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or 
implied, oral or written, is considered an employer. Accordingly, a person or business is 
not an employer until they have a person who is an employee. 
Under § 34A-2-104(l)(b), the terms "employee", "worker", and "operative" have 
the same definition of "each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 
34A-2-103. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the analysis to determine 
employer and employee status under § 34A-2-103(2) and § 34A-2-104(1) turns on the 
traditional "right to control" test. See, Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 
(Utah 1986); Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227, 228-29 (Utah 1977); 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77 ffl[ 9-10, 985 P.2d 243. 
This is distinct from the analysis of the "supervision or control" element for 
statutory employers under § 34A-2-103(7)(a), which examines supervision or control 
under a much less exacting standard. See, Bennett, 726 P.2d at 431-32; Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co., 1999 UT 77 at [^17 n. 8. 
The ALJ never made a finding of fact that Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" 
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within the meaning of § 34A-2-103(2). The ALJ never made an analysis of Pinnacle 
Homes' status as an "employer" within the framework of the right to control test as 
required under §§ 34A-2-103(2) and 104(1) and the controlling case law. 
As discussed above in Section I, the three officers of Pinnacle Homes have opted 
out of employee status pursuant to § 34A-2-104(4). Accordingly, for the purposes of the 
Workers Compensation Act and the Utah Occupational Disease Act, these persons are 
not employees of Pinnacle Homes and Pinnacle Homes is not an "employer" under the 
statutes. 
The ALJ held the term "operative", which is the same definition as "employee" 
and "worker" under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(l)(b), includes "those persons that 
bring about the employer's desired effect." There is no legal support for this addition to 
the statutory definition. Further, the closest language to this proposition is contained in 
the definition of an "independent contractor" under § 34A-2-103(2)(a) in which it states 
that the independent contractor is "subject to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design." Such an expansion of the meaning of a term is 
improper as it would improperly include all independent contractors as operatives, and by 
definition employees, which is not permitted or recognized by the statutes. 
The testimony at hearing was that Platinum Builders were independent 
contractors. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that Platinum Builders was an independent contractor, 
that he received his instructions from Mel Beagley, owner of Platinum Builders, and that 
he would be told to go shingle specific homes. (AR 227: P56, L7 through P59, L3). 
Scott Lawrence, an owner and vice president of operations of Pinnacle Homes, testified 
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that he contracted with Platinum Builders to put a roof on the house from which Mr. 
Ebmeyer fell. (AR 227: P74, L23 through P76, L25). 
Platinum Builders was a general contractor and Mr. Beagley was an 
owner/operator of the business. (AR 227: P78, LI 1 through P79, LI). Mr. Beagley had 
liability insurance and stated that he had opted out of workers compensation as the owner 
of the company. (AR 227: P79, L7-14). 
Pinnacle Homes never provided materials for Platinum Builders' work on Pinnacle 
Homes' property. (AR 227: P79, LI5-19). Pinnacle Homes did not provide supplies or 
tools to Platinum. (AR 227: P79, L20-22). Pinnacle Homes did not supervise or control 
Mr. Beagley or Platinum Builders in any fashion or tell him when, how or what work he 
should be doing. (AR 227: P79, L23 through P80, L4). Pinnacle Homes did not provide 
transportation and was not aware that anyone other than Mr. Beagley was doing work on 
Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P80, L5-12). Pinnacle paid for the work done by Platinum 
on a lump sum contract basis and did not withhold taxes or any other benefits. (AR 227: 
P80,L13 through P81,L4). 
There were no facts presented by any party to suggest that Platinum Builder had 
somehow become an employee of Pinnacle Homes. All the facts presented, which were 
not contradicted and were not opposed, presented evidence to the effect that Platinum 
Builder was an independent contractor and separate from Pinnacle Homes .rather than an 
independent contractor. 
By statutory definition, an independent contractor means any person engaged in 
the performance of work for another who, while so engaged, is: 
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i) independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work; 
ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer; 
iii) engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work; and 
iv) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the 
employer's design. 
§34A-2-103(2)(a). 
Based on the facts cited above, neither Platinum Builders nor Mr. Ebmeyer can be 
considered employees of Pinnacle Homes. Pinnacle Homes did not maintain any right to 
control the execution of the work. Pinnacle Homes did not supervise or regularly inspect 
the work that was being performed. Platinum Builders was engaged in a specific piece of 
work, which was the installation of a roof. Finally, Platinum was only subordinate to 
Pinnacle Homes in that Platinum was effecting a result in accordance with Pinnacle 
Homes' design. By definition, then, Platinum Builders and Mr. Ebmeyer cannot be 
considered Pinnacle Homes employees under the traditional employee test espoused by 
Utah courts. 
As noted above, Pinnacle Homes can only be an employer if it has employees. 
The owners/officers had opted out of employee status pursuant to § 34A-2-104(4). 
Platinum Builders and/or Mr. Ebmeyer were not employees pursuant to the 
uncontradicted evidence. There were no allegations that any other persons could be 
considered employees of Pinnacle Homes within the meaning of § 34A-2-103(2) and 
104(l)(b). Accordingly, Pinnacle Homes does not regularly employ one or more 
operatives, and by definition cannot be an employer for the purposes of § 34A-2-103(7). 
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT PINNACLE HOMES IS 
CONSIDERED AN "EMPLOYER", THE LABOR COMMISSION ERRED 
IN FINDING THAT PINNACLE HOMES HAD ANY SUPERVISION OR 
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CONTROL OVER PLATINUM BUILDERS THAT WARRANTS A 
FINDING THAT MR. EBMEYER WAS PINNACLE HOMES' EMPLOYEE 
The Utah Labor Commission's factual findings that Mr. Ebmeyer was an 
employee under §34A-2-103(7)(a) are not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ 
determined that Pinnacle Homes was the general contractor and retained sufficient 
"supervision or control" over the work of Platinum Builders such that Mr. Ebmeyer was 
considered to be the employee of Pinnacle Homes under §103(7)(a) and liable for his 
injuries and expenses. 
When reviewing the factual findings of the administrative agency, the reviewing 
court "will generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that not all 
issues fall clearly at one end of the spectrum or the other, and recognized that some issues 
involve mixed questions of law and fact. Id. Although the reviewing court will review 
the "underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard," the Court further 
held the "legal effect of those facts is the province of the appellate courts, and no 
deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
Because the Labor Commission on review focused exclusively on whether 
Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104(4), it did not 
focus on whether Pinnacle Homes retained supervision or control over Platinum Builders 
to allow for the "statutory employer" designation under §103(7)(a). As such, Pinnacle 
Homes must focus on the ALJ's findings and conclusions in this regard. 
21 
The ALJ determined that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor and, as such, 
was responsible for Mr. Ebmeyer's injuries. The ALJ further found that because 
Pinnacle Homes retained supervision and control over the project, Mr. Ebmeyer was an 
"employee" under § 34A-2-103(7)(a). Under Bennett, the ALJ determined that 
supervision or control "requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control 
over the project." Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432 (citations omitted). 
The uncontradicted testimony provided at the hearing was that Platinum Builders 
was a general contractor with a general contractors license. (AR 227: P81, Ll l through 
P82, LI6). Pinnacle Homes, as the owner of the home in question, contracted with 
Platinum Builders, a general contractor, to oversee the completion of putting a roof on the 
home owned by Pinnacle Homes. As a result thereof, the analysis utilized for Pinnacle 
Homes should have been directed at Platinum Builders as the general contractor in charge 
of placing the roof on the house. Platinum Builders was responsible for this overall 
project and, as such, any statutory employer analysis should not have included Pinnacle 
Homes. 
In this regard, Pinnacle Homes does not fit the general definition of a general 
contractor. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(18). Normally, a general contractor is hired by 
a client and is paid a fixed amount pursuant to a master contract with the builder. The 
general contractor makes money off the margin of what it would cost him to sub-contract 
the work out and the overall master contract. 
In this case, Pinnacle Homes is the owner of the property and should not be 
considered the general contractor as Pinnacle Homes was not hired as a general 
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contractor, but was building a home it hoped to sell on the open market. In this respect, 
Pinnacle Homes was its own client and contracted with a general contractor, Platinum 
Builders, to construct a roof on the home Pinnacle owned. 
In turn, Platinum Builders received a contract rate and sub-contracted to Mr. 
Ebmeyer. Platinum Builders made money off the margin of the contract amount and 
what it was willing to pay Mr. Ebmeyer, which is the traditional role of a general 
contractor. 
The sole reason the ALJ concluded that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor 
was because it contracted with Platinum Builders to put a roof on the building in 
question. That was it. From this one determination, the ALJ then ruled that Pinnacle 
Homes was a statutory employer and liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's industrial injury. From a 
policy standpoint, any real estate investor who purchases a home to fix it up and sell it on 
the market is now a general contractor if the real estate investor contracts with a general 
contractor to repair or construct anything on the home. 
Pinnacle Homes does not believe that contracting with a licensed general contactor 
to do a job that is less than building the full house makes the home owner a general 
contractor and subject to liability. Pinnacle Homes believes this ruling is too broad and 
would subject numerous unintending persons and entities to unlimited liability if a 
general contractor's employee gets injured while working on the home. 
A, THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT PINNACLE HOMES WAS A 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The uncontradicted testimony provided at the hearing was that Platinum Builders 
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was a general contractor with a general contractor's license. (AR 227: P81, LI 1 through 
P82, LI6). The ALJ utilized the fact that Pinnacle Homes contracted with Platinum 
Builders to place a roof on the house as proof positive that Pinnacle Homes was a general 
contractor itself. (AR 227: P81, L l l through P84, L3). Because Pinnacle Homes 
contracted with Platinum Builders, the ALJ extended a legal definition, general 
contractor, to Pinnacle Homes in this transaction. 
Again, Pinnacle homes contracted with a general contractor to do a job that was 
less than the whole of the house, but was necessary for Pinnacle Homes as the owner of 
the house to sell the house. The analysis should have been whether Platinum Builders, as 
the general contractor, had supervision and control over putting the roof on the house, 
which it did. The uncontradicted testimony at the hearing provided that Platinum 
Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR 227: 
P80, LI3 - LI8). That Pinnacle Homes did not direct or control Mr. Beagley or Platinum 
Builders about how the work was done and left the inspections of the houses up to the 
cities and to Platinum Builders. (AR 227: P98, L9 through P99, L5). 
If the definition of a general contractor is a person who owns a property, but does 
not live in it, and makes a renovation or addition to the home in preparation for sale of 
the home, then may more people would be considered general contractor despite the 
statutory provisions that must be met in order to be a general contractor. 
The ALJ determined that Pinnacle Homes was the general contractor. See, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, AR 143-150, Page 2. The ALJ 
determined that because Platinum Builders was a subcontractor who employed Mr. 
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Ebmeyer, Mr. Ebmeyer was the statutory employee of Pinnacle Homes. Id. 
Consequently, the ALJ applied the holding in Bennett to award benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer 
and to find Pinnacle Homes partially responsible for said benefits. 
The ALJ's decision relied heavily on Bennett v. Industrial Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1986). In Bennett, the focus was on a general contractor, whose business was 
construction. Id. at 431. There is nothing to suggest the general contractor earned money 
doing anything other than getting paid for construction work. There was no evidence to 
suggest that the general contractor was working on a project which it owned or had any 
interest in, other than getting paid for the act of building. 
On those facts, a general contractor who subcontracts for the performance of a 
portion of the construction work which it has undertaken retains sufficient supervision or 
control to meet the relaxed standard under § 34A-2-103(7). However, those are not the 
facts in the instant case. 
Pinnacle Homes did not accept or seek a job to do construction work. Pinnacle 
Homes' work was not to perform construction. Pinnacle Homes specifically retained 
others to perform any necessary construction work. Pinnacle Homes' sole business was 
the selling of homes. Because Pinnacle Homes hired Platinum Builders, the ALJ 
immediately found that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor, despite the fact there 
was no evidence presented that Pinnacle Homes was a traditional general contractor. 
Even if Pinnacle Homes was deemed to be an employer, the work being performed 
by Platinum Builders was not construction. Pinnacle Homes' owners/officers did not 
engage in or participate in any construction work. (AR 227: P88, L21 through P89, L7). 
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This presents a different situation than in the Bennett case. 
In Bennett, an admitted general contractor was held responsible for payment of 
benefits for the employee of a sub-contractor because the sub-contracted portion was part 
of the general contractor's trade or business. Id at 431-32. Realistically, if a sub-
contractor fails to perform its work, a general contractor has its own employees who can 
step in and perform the work. Pinnacle Homes does not have anyone who engages in 
construction work. If Platinum Builders had failed to complete its scope of work, 
Pinnacle Homes did not have anyone to send to finish the job. They would have had to 
find someone else to finish the work because Pinnacle Homes does not engage in 
construction activities and is not a general contractor. 
There was no evidence entertained or presented at the hearing that would have 
allowed the ALJ to consider Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor. There is no 
definition of "general contractor" in the workers compensation statutes and the language 
in Bennett does not provide a clear analysis of what should be considered a general 
contractor. With the absence of any evidence presented as to what a general contractor is 
expected to do and what the definition of a general contractor is, the Labor Commission 
erred by finding that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor. 
The problem is proving a negative - if there is no evidence presented as to what a 
general contractor is, how can the Commission rule that Pinnacle Homes was a general 
contractor and how can Pinnacle Homes disprove the ruling that it was a general 
contractor. The undisputed facts remain that Pinnacle Homes owned the home worked 
on by Platinum Builders. As an owner it contracted with a general contractor to place a 
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roof on the home Pinnacle Homes owned. To make the leap that Pinnacle Homes is now 
a general contractor, absent any definition regarding the same, was an error and 
supported by the evidence presented at the trial. The fact that Pinnacle Homes contracted 
with Platinum Builders does not automatically make Pinnacle Homes a general 
contractor. 
The Commission's analysis of "supervision or control" was better geared to the 
only general contractor in the case - Platinum Builders. It was inappropriate to consider 
Pinnacle Homes a general contractor without defining what a general contractor is and 
without providing a factual basis for considering Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor 
for merely hiring a professional general contractor to place a roof on the home it owned. 
As a result, any analysis of Pinnacle Homes as a general contractor is misplaced and not 
supported either in law or fact and this Court should overturn the Commission ruling with 
respect to the legal conclusion that Pinnacle Homes was a general contractor.. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Pinnacle Homes requests this Court overturn the 
Commission's determination that Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" as Pinnacle Homes 
was not considered an employer under §34A-2-103(2). Even if this Court finds that 
Pinnacle Homes was an "employer" under the Workers Compensation Statutes, Pinnacle 
Homes requests this Court overturn the Commission Order holding Pinnacle Homes 
liable as a general contractor as there was no evidence as to what a general contractor is 
and whether Pinnacle Homes matched that definition. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
GLEN M EBMEYER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY 
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND; 
PINNACLE HOMES INC and/or 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 2003919 
Judge Dale W Sessions 
THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on August 30, 2004 at 11:29 AM. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. The Honorable Dale W Sessions, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
"ALJ") presided. The petitioner, Glen M Ebmeyer, was present and represented by his/her 
attorney Timothy Allen Esq. The Respondents Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley, was not present 
; and Pinnacle Homes Inc, and Uninsured Employers Fund were represented by attorney 
Theodore Kanell Esq, and Elliot R Lawrence Esq. 
Having failed to appear to defend the action following appropriate notice, default was 
entered on the record against Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley. 
THE ALJ having in mind the testimony and other evidence before it, now enters 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
in this matter as follows: 
1. Petitioner was injured while he was working for Respondents Pinnacle Homes, 
Inc., Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley on August 11, 2003. 
2. Petitioner was acting in the scope and course of his employment at the time he 
was injured. He was roofing a home when a gust of wind swept him off of the 
roof. 
3. The nature of Petitioner's injuries include injury to both heels, wrist and elbow of 
the right hand/arm. 
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4. At the time of injury, Petitioner was earning $ 15-$ 18 per hour working 
approximately 40 hours per week, with an average weekly rate of $500.00. His 
compensation rate is $334.00 per week. 
5. At the time of the injury, Petitioner was not married and had no dependent 
children. 
6. Petitioner remained off work from the date of his injury to the present time. He 
claims temporary total disability for the maximum allowed period of time, to wit 
312 weeks. 
7. Petitioner has not yet reached stability or maximum medical improvement for his 
injuries. His disability has not yet been rated. 
8. Respondent is a statutory employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §34A-
2-103. Stated another way, because Petitioner was an employee of the sub-
contractor, he is a statutory employee of the general contractor in this instance. 
9. Respondents hired Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley to work for them on 
homes which they built to sell. The homes were not private residences of any 
principle of the Respondent Pinnacle Homes, Inc., but were built for the purpose 
of selling the completed homes for profit. 
10. Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was contracted to put a roof on a house in 
Saratoga Springs. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the general contractor. They sub-
contract to Platinum Home Builders. 
11. Petitioner was an employee of Platinum Builders and thereby a statutory 
employee of Pinnacle Homes, Inc. 
12. The Corporation of Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was established in 2002. The 
principles of the corporation have opted out of workers compensation coverage 
for themselves. This they are permitted to do under the law. However, they 
cannot escape the purposes and intent of the legislature in requiring that 
employees be covered for the injuries that they receive as a direct result of their 
employment. 
13. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., retained indirect control over the Petitioner. They alone 
decided who to hire as a sub-contractor on the specific homes within their 
business plan. Whether they exercised direct control over who the sub-contractor 
would hire is another matter. 
14. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether Platinum Builders and/or Mel 
Beagley is solvent or not. Therefore, the Uninsured Employers Fund faces the 
obligation to pay whatever Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley fails to pay, with 
their right to proceed in contribution from Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley 
intact. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is solvent, is an ongoing business and optimistic 
about the future of their business enterprise. 
15. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he did not sign the Master Service Agreement. His 
testimony is credible on that issue. His signature is not the same as on other 
documents in the Commission file including the Application for Hearing. 
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Further, it appears that someone attempted the signature on the wrong line, and 
then re-created the signature below the false start attempt at the signature 
16. Petitioner was able to work alone with Mel Beagley coming occasionally to see 
him at a job site. On occasion, a truck belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc., would 
drive through the area. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the owner of the house 
Petitioner was working on at the time he was injured. 
17. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., truck containing a person presumably from that company 
arrived once to ask if Petitioner was going to be fixing another home nearby. It is 
clear that Pinnacle Homes, Inc., had an expectation that Petitioner would be 
working on another project. 
18. Petitioner worked on 6 different homes belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc. 
19. Petitioner has not obtained an impairment rating and an opinion about 
stabilization because he cannot afford it. 
20. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is an ongoing and profitable business, presumable capable 
of paying some or all of the benefits awarded to Petitioner. 
21. Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is/are still in business, presumably in a 
profitable status and capable of paying some or all benefits awarded to Petitioner. 
The ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
in this matter as follows: 
22. Each person in the service of any employer who employs one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is an employee. 
Utah Code Ami §34A-2-104(l)(b). An operative is includes those persons that 
bring about the employers desired effect. 
23. In this case, Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was an operative of Pinnacle 
Homes, Inc. Testimony showed that it was a course and design of Pinnacle 
Homes Inc., to sub-contract work for their business enterprise. Petitioner worked 
on approximately 6 different homes for Pinnacle Homes, Inc. It appears that they 
may be seeking to avoid paying taxes, benefits and for maintaining workers 
compensation insurance on direct employees, so they use operatives instead. 
24. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is liable for the costs of injury because they are a statutory 
employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42(2) which states: 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
such contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under 
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him, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are 
considered employees of the original employer. 
25. Quoting in depth from Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1986): According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to 
protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing 
ultimate liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it 
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and 
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." Larson, supra, 
§ 49.14. A secondary purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of 
[workmen's compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their 
regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment 
relations with the workers . . . . " Id. § 49.15. 
Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of 
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or 
control over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor 
is a "part or process in the trade or business of the employer." E.g., Pinter 
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984); Rustler Lodge v. 
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318 (1975). 
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer," if it is part of the operations which directly relate to the successful 
performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise. Pinter 
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 
1128, 1131 (Utah 1977); King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30 A.2d 549, 
552 (1943). The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction 
business is construction, Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972); 
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 289, 508 P.2d 805, 807 
(1973); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1214, 1223 (1944), and any portion of the general 
contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be 
considered "part or process in the trade or business of the general contractor. 
The requirement in § 35-1-42(2) that the general contractor, as a "statutory 
employer," retain "supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor who 
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by {726 P.2d 432} definition, be equated 
with the common law standard for determining whether a person is an employee 
or an independent contractor. In dealing with "statutory" employees, the statute 
begins with the proposition that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the 
subcontractor. But the statutory requirement that the general contractor have 
"supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the 
subcontractor must also qualify as an employee of the general contractor. That 
would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather, 
the term "supervision or control" requires only that the general contractor retain 
ultimate control over the project. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 
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309. As stated in Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 
944(1968), 
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to 
delegate to a greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor 
remains responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of 
necessity retains the right to require that subcontractors perform according to 
specifications. The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of 
subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain 
supervision or control over the subcontractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v. 
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See generally Tanner Companies v. Superior 
Court, 144 Ariz. 141, 146, 696 P.2d 693, 698 (1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting). 
Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general 
contractor's business, an inference arises that the general contractor has retained 
supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement of 
§ 35-1-42(2). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 316, 172 
P.2d 136,140(1946). 
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2) should be construed 
in favor of protecting the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 307; 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at 225, 364 P.2d at 
1022 (1961); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 187-88, 290 P.2d 
692, 693-94 (1955). The Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an almost 
identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created scheme by 
which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the coverage of the 
[Workmen's Compensation] Act." Young v. Environmental Air Products, Inc., 136 
Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00. Wisconsin 
has also recognized the broad scope of its similar statute: 
The entire statutory scheme indicates a desire on the part of the legislature 
to extend the protection of these laws to those who might not be deemed 
employees (726 P.2d 433} under the legal concepts governing the liability of a 
master for the tortious acts of his servant. Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord, 
47 Wis. 2d 704, 715-16, 177 N.W.2d 904, 910 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
26. In sum, it is well established that when an employer has retained the right to 
control the work of a worker's compensation claimant (such as select the sub-
contractor in the first place) the claimant is the employer's employee for workers 
compensation purposes. In detercnining whether the employee has retained the 
right of control the factors to consider include: the right to direct performance of 
the work, the right to hire and fire, responsibility for payment of wages and 
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providing necessary equipment. But these factors are not inclusive and one factor 
is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor Commission, 
967 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately it is the right to control that is 
determinative. "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is 
determinative." Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1995). 
27. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is the employer of Petitioner in this instance and should be 
liable for the injuries to Petitioner. 
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters the 
ORDER 
of the Labor Commission as follows: 
28. Respondent Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is hereby defaulted. 
29. Respondents Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley and Pinnacle Homes, Inc., are 
jointly and severally liable for the injuries, lost wages and medical costs of 
Petitioner as his employer(s). 
30. Jurisdiction over the Uninsured Employers Fund of Utah is reserved. 
31. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability payments of $334.00 per week 
from August 11, 2003 until he is medically stable not to exceed 312 weeks. This 
amount is computed using $500 per week average weekly wage as stipulated at 
hearing. 
32. Petitioner is awarded compensation that includes payment of his medical bills that 
are reasonably related to his industrial injury. 
33. Petitioner is awarded 8% interest on payments due him in this order from the time 
they are accrued and/or due until paid in full. 
34. Petitioner's attorney, Timothy Allen, Esq., is awarded attorney fees established by 
the rules and sliding scale of the Labor Commission for meaningful services in this 
case. His fee is to be paid directly out of the award to Petitioner and paid to him 
directly. Likewise as each payment becomes due, a separate check will be sent to 
Mr. Allen for his fee. 
DATED March 24, 2005. 
' / h^7 .^."O* .A 
Dale Wgp^sions 
Administrate Law Judge 
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A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 24, 2005, to the persons/parties at 
the following addresses: 
Glen M Ebmeyer 
330N800WApt2 
Salt Lake City UT 84116 
Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley 
Box 1384 
RivertonUT 84065 
Pinnacle Homes Inc 
479 W 300 N 
American Fork UT 84003 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Timothy Allen Esq 
350S400EN113 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Theodore Kanell Esq 
136 ES Temple Ste 1700 
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Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Barry N Johnson Esq 
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Elliot R Lawrence Esq 
160E200S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
UTAH LABORTC 
division 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
^FC0¥EC 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
22g£ bp^ 
GLEN M. EBMEYER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PLATINUM BUILDERS, INC., 
PINNACLE HOMES, INC., and 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 03-0919 
Pinnacle Homes, Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review 
Administrative Law Judge Sessions' determination that Pinnacle shares liability with Platinum 
Builders, Inc. for Glen M. Ebmeyer's medical and disability benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
While working as a roofer for Platinum Builders, Inc.l on August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer fell 
and suffered serious injuries. On September 19, 2003, Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application to compel 
Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Ebmeyer 
added Pinnacle Homes, Inc. as a respondent in its capacity as the owner and builder of the house 
where the accident occurred. Mr. Ebmeyer also added the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF'') as a 
respondent because neither Platinum nor Pinnacle carried workers' compensation insurance.2 
Judge Sessions held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 24,2004. On March 24, 
2005, he awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum and Pinnacle jointly and severally 
liable for those benefits. Platinum was held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer. Pinnacle was 
held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to §34A-2-103(7) of the Act. 
1 Judge Sessions' decision refers to "Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley." However, the record 
indicates that Platinum Builders was a Utah corporation in good standing at the time of Mr. 
Ebmeyer's work injury and that Mel Beagley was the corporation's owner. Under these facts, Mr. 
Ebmeyer's claim is against the corporation, rather than against Mr. Beagley as an individual. 
2 Pursuant to §34A-2-704 of the Act, the UEF assists in paying benefits to injured workers whose 
employers are insolvent, in receivership, or are otherwise unable to pay benefits. 
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In requesting review of Judge Sessions' decision, Pinnacle argues it does not meet § 34A-2-
103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer. Pinnacle also argues that, even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's 
statutory employer, Platinum remains primarily liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits and Pinnacle is 
only secondarily liable for those benefits. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board finds the following facts material to Pinnacle's motion for review. The 
Appeals Board also adopts Judge Sessions' findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this 
decision. 
Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of building and then selling new residential 
houses. The corporation consists of three individuals who are its officers and owners. Apart from 
these three officers, Pinnacle has no employees. It contracts with other companies and contractors to 
do the actual work necessary to build its houses. 
At the time Pinnacle started doing business, its insurance agent advised the company that it 
could exclude its officers/owners from workers' compensation coverage, in which case the company 
would have no employees and would not require workers' compensation insurance. Based on this 
advice, Pinnacle did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. However, Pinnacle did not 
submit written notice to its insurance carrier of its intent to exclude corporate officers from workers' 
compensation coverage. 
Platinum, also a Utah corporation at the time of Mr. Ebmeyer's accident, was in the business 
of installing roofs on houses. Pinnacle engaged Platinum to do the roofing on several houses 
Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs. Platinum in turn hired Mr. Ebmeyer to work as a roofer 
on one of those houses. Platinum did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. 
On August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer was completing the roof of the house in question when he 
accidentally fell and suffered the serious injuries. He now seeks workers' compensation benefits for 
those injuries. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to provide 
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured in work-related accidents. None of the parties 
challenge Judge Sessions' determination that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits for his injuries or Judge Sessions' determination that Platinum is liable for those benefits. 
However, Pinnacle argues that Judge Sessions erred in concluded that Pinnacle is also liable for 
those benefits as Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer under §103(7)(a) of the Act. The material 
provisions of §103(7)(a) are as follows: 
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
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the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or 
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the 
contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor... are considered employees 
of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter . . . . 
Pinnacle argues that because it had no employees, it was not an employer. Consequently, it 
falls outside the scope of §103(7)(a), which is specifically limited to those entities who are 
employers. The Appeals Board agrees that §103(7)(a) applies only to employers. Under the 
circumstances of this case, Pinnacle's status as an employer depends on whether its corporate 
officers are employees for purposes of the workers' compensation system. 
Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as ". .. each person . .. who regularly 
employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business . . . under any contract of hire " 
Section 104(4)(c) of the Act specifically provides that "[a] director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee . . . until the notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given." 
The notice requirements of §104(4)(b) are as follows (emphasis added): "If a corporation 
makes an election under Subsection (4)(a) [to exclude a corporate officer or director as an 
employee], the corporation shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage." 
Consequently, unless Pinnacle complied with the notice requirements of §104(4)(b), its 
officers must be considered employees and Pinnacle must be considered an employer. Furthermore, 
corporations must strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and 
directors from coverage. In Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.3d 257 (Utah 1998), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered an earlier version of § 104(4)(b). The Court stated: 
This court construes workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of 
finding employee coverage. In Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 
1990), we stated, "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the 
Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when 
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction." . . . . Allowing exclusion of 
a director from coverage on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the 
Workers' Compensation Act liberally against coverage. This we will not do. We 
find that constructive notice is not a substitute for the written notice required by 
section 35-l-43(3)(b). 
In order to exclude its corporate officers as "employees," §104(4)(b) required Pinnacle to 
serve its insurance carrier3 with a written notice naming the persons to be excluded. Pinnacle did not 
3 In the context of § 104(4)(b) specifically and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this 
reference to "insurance carrier" must be understood as referring to the employer's workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, and not to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage. 
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provide such notice. Consequently, Pinnacle's officers remained employees and, for that reason, 
Pinnacle remained an employer. As an employer, Pinnacle is subject to the statutory employer 
provisions of §103(7) and is liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits. 
Pinnacle argues that even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer, its liability for his 
benefits is secondary to Platinum's liability. Pinnacle's argument continues that Mr. Ebmeyer must 
first seek his benefits from Platinum before he can compel Pinnacle to pay any benefits. Pinnacle 
does not cite any authority for this argument, which runs contrary to the plain language of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. As already noted, both Platinum and Pinnacle are Mr. Ebmeyer's 
employers and, as such, they are each liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits. While it may be true that 
Pinnacle may obtain reimbursement from Platinum for any benefits Pinnacle pays, Mr. Ebmeyer is 
entitled to obtain payment from either or both of his two employers. 
ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Sessions' decision and denies 
Pinnacle's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this Jrf day o: 
CONCURRING OPINION 
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance upon Section 
34 A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees, within the meaning of § 104(4), are 
directors and officers. By enacting this section, the Utah Legislature has clearly established the 
public policy that certain limited, corporate employees maybe exempt from workers' compensation 
coverage. However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to comply with 
the notice requirements of § 104(4)(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance carrier to notify, in writing, 
of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its' officers and directors from coverage and as "employees' under the 
Act. The majority's decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle; 
they could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance carrier which 
essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but we do not need workers' 
compensation coverage because we are electing to exempt all our officers and directors, which are 
our only employees, from coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to 
being "employers" under §103(7)(a). 
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Instead, I believe that facts in this case support the conclusion that Pinnacle acted as a general 
contractor with sufficient supervisor control that the subcontractors became employees of Pinnacle 
and Pinnacle is therefore an "employer" pursuant to §103(7)(a). Had Pinnacle desired to insulate 
itself from workers' compensation liability under the Act, it could have retained an independent 
general contractor which had appropriate workers' compensation insurance coverage. 
JosAffti E. Hatch ~~~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
GLEN M. EBMEYER 
PAGE 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Glen 
M. Ebmeyer, Case No. 03 -0919, was mailed first class postage prepaid this £$ day of JttryT20p6, to 
the following: (Xutucd^ 
Glen M. Ebmeyer 
330 N 800 W Apt 12 




Pinnacle Homes Inc 
479W300N 
American Fork UT 84003 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160 E 300 S 3rd Fl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 ' 
Timothy Allen, Esq. 
350 S 400 EN 113 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Theodore Kanell, Esq. 
136 ES Temple Ste 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Barry N Johnson, Esq. 
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
Theodore E. Kanell (1768) 
Andrew M. Wads worth (9517) 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC 
Attorney for Respondent Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PINNACLE HOMES INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; 
PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY 
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND; 
and GLEN M EBMEYER, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appeal No. 
Agency Decision No. 2003919 
Notice is hereby given that PINNACLE HOMES INC., Petitioner, petitions the Utah Court 
of Appeals to review the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the respondent 
on March 24, 2005, and the Order Denying Motion for Review entered by the respondent on August 
29, 2006. Petitioner seeks review of the entirety of both Orders. 
Petitioner request the court to direct the respondent UTAH LABOR COMMISSION to 
prepare and certify to the court its entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and 
evidence taken in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this Z& — day of September, 2006, 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Andrew M. Wadsworth 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 2006,1 faxed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW to the following: 
Attorney for Glen M. Ebmeyer 
Timothy C. Allen 
350 South 400 East, #113 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Platinum Builders 
David J. Holds worth 
9125 S Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Barry N. Johnson 
3-865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Allen L. Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
PO Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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